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Read’s (2008) essay on the option of biosphere carbon stock management (BCSM) nicely
connects a number of climate-related themes which he has extensively published on during
the past few decades: concern about abrupt climate change (ACC) due to system non-
linearities; inclusion of ACC in the precautionary principle; the underestimation of the
short-term contribution to addressing climate change when the use of bio energy would
significantly increase; the carbon capture potential of investment in undercapitalised, often
degraded land; the potential of ‘negative emissions scenarios’ by linking biomass production
to carbon capture and storage (CCS); and, finally, the point that emissions caps would in
many respects be inferior to obligations to introduce policy-desirable technologies.
The basic argument he unfolds in his essay is quite straightforward: the maximum
impact of an ‘aggressive’ mitigation-oriented climate policy regime (i.e. a regime beyond
the most ambitious publicly stated mitigation targets) is CO2-stabilisation at 400–450 ppm
by 2050–2100. Only a few people believe such a stabilisation can be achieved.
Consequently, one should be prepared to face stabilisation of emissions at (significantly)
higher levels. Because of the immanent threat of ACC, the precautionary principle should
be applied not only to deal with the risks of climate change, but also to deal with the risk of
abrupt climate change. In order to achieve lower emission levels sooner, a more extensive
policy package is required than what we have been witnessing thus far (at least in the public
statements). The best option for such a package would be BCSM, combined with CCS.
The essay raises a number of questions:
1. Is it conceivable that in the near future both policy makers and the broader public
become equally aware of ACC as they have now become of the climate change issue? I
presume that the answer to that is ‘yes’ when much of the recent literature on the issue
is taken seriously, i.e. that there is at least a chance that processes get out of control.
The present general concern about climate change has emerged during roughly the past
decade (or, according to some, the last few years) after the first scientific and political
work had been completed during the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s (IPCC AR1/
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2 and UNCCC). In other words, within about two decades, climate change has gone
through a process of a broad scientific assessment, which has resulted in the
recognition of the topic as being a very serious issue at high political levels. A similar
process could unfold with respect to ACC during the next few decades if a growing
amount of convincing scientific evidence would demonstrate that non-linearities in the
system may generate the risk that processes, which thus far have been perceived as
linear, may escalate.
2. Next question: Does the assumption that ACC should not be ruled out imply that
preventive action should be developed right away? In other words: what are the
boundaries of the precautionary principle? Eventually, the answer to that question
seems to be a moral one, although some would probably claim (as has, for instance,
extensively been done with regard to the application of social discount rates or
statistical values of ecosystems or human lives) that such parameter values can be
determined quasi objectively. Irrespective of the position taken, it is a crucial point in
Read’s argument: if ACC is a possibility, then we should develop a matching policy
action right away in order to be able to accelerate mitigation. In reaction to that,
however, I would argue that if ACC cannot be ruled out as a serious future threat, it is
important to prepare ourselves to take future action, but such action would not be
necessarily needed already now. There is no use for the fire brigade to drive around if
there is no fire yet. Nevertheless, should there be sufficient evidence that the risk of a
fire exists, then one should prepare the equipment and train the firemen well in time so
that they can act quickly enough, etc.
3. If action in the near future would be needed to reduce emissions much more quickly
than anticipated thus far in even the most ambitious mitigation scheme, what would be
the preferred scenario? Read’s answer is clear: the ‘only’ option is the carbon stock
management approach, BCSM, preferably combined with CCS. The main argument for
this answer is that the BCSM potential has been so far underestimated or even
“overlooked” despite the fact that the mitigation potential of the option is very
significant with generally positive externalities. An obvious comment on this position
is that, when assessing the optimal technology mix in a hypothetical near(er)-term
declining CO2-concentration scenario, one should try to carry out an optimisation
process based on knowledge of various technology cost functions, taking the various
externalities, distributional impact and other boundary conditions into account, etc.
Read has not tried to do that, which makes his strong reliance on BCSM + CSS at least
partly based on the presumption that accelerating mitigation profiles on a sufficiently
large scale cannot be achieved with the help of the classical mitigation mix of
increasing energy efficiency, renewables, fuel switch, nuclear, etc. This observation
may be correct, but the question remains how rapidly and cost-effectively emissions
would come down (vis-à-vis realistic baselines) if e.g. serious efforts were undertaken
to stimulate international transfers of technologies in conjunction with well-designed
accommodating transition management in the receiving countries. Another option
could be to assess the potential of using the ocean for enhanced biomass formation, etc.
Also, it can be questioned whether it is correct to claim—as Read does—that, from a
technological perspective, mitigation through land management is much easier than
mitigation through reduction of fuel use.
But let us start again from Read’s final argument that the likelihood of accelerating
emission reduction on a large scale is probably highest when activating BCSM. Then, the
next question is how realistic the claim—or as Read puts it somewhere in his essay
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‘hope’—is that massive BCSM can really be implemented successfully and with the
proclaimed effect? This question has already led to a bottom-up vs top-down discussion
about the carbon stock management mitigation potential, which does not need to be
repeated here. Basically, Read wants to activate biomass production on land, which is
presently not used for serious economic activities (except for hunting, gathering and slash
and burn agriculture), and help dwellers and others develop into biomass-for-energy
farmers. Can this be achieved at a very significant scale?
It will not be easy to answer this question without serious additional research on the
various behavioural and sociological, as well as legal aspects that such a shift/migration
would involve. But also the issue of economic incentives would need to be addressed: why
would a commonly poor traditional slash-and burn farmer in a developing country turn into
a biomass producer for the wider, possibly worldwide, energy market?
It also raises the question of how such an activity would relate to the commonly nearest
alternative, i.e. use the formerly un- or limitedly productive land to grow biomass for food.
In fact, there is increasing evidence that it has become increasingly difficult for food
production to keep pace with demand. There is no guarantee that what has been achieved
globally between e.g. 1970 and 2005 will, and even can, happen again in the near future.
Between 1970 and 2005, the population growth by about 2.8 billion people was
accompanied by a more than sufficient 90% increase in grain production. In fact, the
number of people suffering from hunger declined by about a quarter during this period
(from some 1 billion to some 750 million). The success of this green revolution can be
explained among others, next to technological factors, by the strong increase in the use of
fertilizer in the developing world (×4), the substantial extension of the area under irrigation
(×1.5), and the extension of the area for agriculture due to deforestation.
However, there is little reason to expect that the green revolution of the past 3–4
decennia can easily be repeated in the developing world. Not only does the IPCC expect
that, due to climate change, the grain production in the developing world will be 15–45%
less by 2080 than today’s levels, it is also unlikely that the higher demand for food in
developing countries due to a population increase of about 2 billion people between now
and 2025, can be met by food production in developing countries. The main reason for this
is that there will be fewer quality areas for crop production available due to land losses
caused by erosion (some 7 million hectares per annum), urbanisation, desertification (about
one-third of land area threatened by that), salinisation (some 100 million hectares
degraded), deforestation (some 10 million ha per annum), and lack of water (water demand
for agriculture, some 65% of total demand is likely to increase from 2,600 km3 to
3,200 km3 in 2025, which will be very hard to meet). Consequently, land, particularly land
for agriculture in developing regions, will become increasingly scarce. Land problems in
the industrialized area may be similar in a world that faces an estimate increase in the global
demand for grains of 40–45% by 2025 compared to levels in 2000. For meat, a 60–65%
increase in demand is expected between 2000 and 2025. Food prices are therefore likely to
increase as a trend, which may compete both directly and indirectly, with BCSM.
If these trends are realistic, in combination with a large-scale BCSM at the same time for
climate policy reasons, conflicting claims—which we are facing already in various parts of
the world—on land use seem to be very likely. Currently, biomass (some 55 EJ) covers
some 15% of global energy needs (although the percentage is much higher in most of the
developing countries, China/Brazil some 30%, India some 45%). Projections for 2025 differ
widely (60–145 EJ), but still there is a common expectation that the share will increase.
However, if one would use the conservative assumption that the current share of biomass in
worldwide energy demand of appr. 15% would be maintained by 2025, then the land area
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for biomass-for-energy production would have to increase by some 150 million hectares,
and probably much more if low-productivity, formerly unused areas would be used for that.
Given the food-related arguments just mentioned, it is hard to see this happen without
serious and large-scale availability and ownership problems. This would come on top of the
already ongoing discussions on the need to introduce biomass-for-energy production
certification systems in order to prevent unsustainable biomass production further adding to
the BCSM complexity.
It will not be easy—given the increasing claims on land for food production—to achieve
Read’s target, i.e. to achieve large-scale BCSM. Yet, if ACC would develop into the major
issue that some believe it will become, creativity is needed. It is definitely true that large
areas of land will remain unused even if the search for agricultural land becomes more
intensive. So, Read’s concept deserves to be taken up and above all researched further in
order to see how successful BCSM could become in a future world, which, however, may
face increasing difficulties to meet growing demand for food, water and energy.
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